以色列政府正试图对最高法院进行全面改革，但这不是一个司法改革，而是更像是一场反民主的政变。不到两个月前上台的政府极右翼联盟正在以极快的速度制定一系列极具争议的法律，这些法律加在一起意味着一件非常简单的事情：政府将有权通过它想要的任何法律，以任何它喜欢的方式解释现行法律，不受权力制约，也不保护少数人的权利。
在大多数民主国家，政府的权力受到制约，少数人的权利通过一些机制得到保护，例如宪法、独立的最高法院、联邦制度和对国际法庭的承认。这些机制都不适用于现政府正在拟议的新以色列法律制度。
在政府的言辞中，他们说并没有不要民主。与其他地方的极右翼一样，他们声称比其批评者更民主。但这是基于对民主的一个非常狭隘的定义，那就是只关注选举中的多数，实际上将民主等同于不受限制的多数独裁。在新的法律制度下，没人清楚什么会阻止现政府或未来的政府通过各项法律，例如关闭反对派报纸、剥夺工人罢工的权利、废除学术自由、将同性恋定为犯罪、取缔阿拉伯政党，剥夺阿拉伯公民的选举权，或者——也许最重要的是——改变选举制度本身，以确保永久掌握权力。
当被问及什么可以排除这些情况，保护少数人的权利，甚至保护大多数公民免受政府滥用权力的影响时，现在的联合政府成员的回答实际上是：“我们的善意。相信我们。”这是一个令人毛骨悚然的答案，历史上每一个暴君、流氓和虐待配偶的受害者都很熟悉这种话。独裁者总是说“相信我们，我们会保护你。但要小心不要失去我们的善意，是吗？我们不希望任何不好的事情发生在你身上。”
如果你碰巧遇到任何人将以色列目前的反民主政变描述为一种良性的民主改革，那么有一个关键问题要问他们：“向我解释：什么机制会限制新法律下政府的权力？有没有一件事是政府不被允许做的？”
这种威胁尤为明显，因为以色列是一个两极分化严重的社会，执政的极右联盟成员经常表达对少数群体的蔑视。事实上，本周在以色列议会就立法进行辩论时，来自犹太权力党的联盟成员 Almog Cohen 进行直播时对阿拉伯政党成员发表种族主义评论，将他们比作野兽。阿拉伯人和其他少数民族在多大程度上可以将他们的基本人权托付给像科恩这样的人的善意？
这件巨大的威胁招致了强烈的抵抗。甚至作为国家新兴经济引擎的以色列高科技部门的部分部门也宣布进入紧急状态，让员工有时间参加特拉维夫和耶路撒冷街头的抗议活动。随着国际投资者恐慌，数十亿美元已经逃离，科技巨头们知道，如果没有独立的司法机构和民主社会，他们的整个行业将处于危险之中。
如果抵抗运动失败，一个不自由、不民主的以色列会是什么样子？以色列和其他地方的许多人将其与匈牙利相提并论，尤其是考虑到匈牙利政权与以色列新政权关系密切。但一个不民主的以色列不会像匈牙利那样。
首先，匈牙利仍然是欧盟成员国，并希望保持这一地位，这意味着欧盟的制度和法律还能限制匈牙利政权的所作所为。以色列不属于任何此类联盟，因此对以色列新政权的权力和野心也不会有类似的限制。
其次，匈牙利政府统治着匈牙利公民。相比之下，以色列在被占领土地上统治着数百万巴勒斯坦人。以色列民主政府对待巴勒斯坦人已经很糟糕，在以色列民主被摧毁后，情况可能会变得更糟。
第三，匈牙利人口正在老龄化，支持匈牙利政权的主要是年长的保守派人士，他们可能喜欢追随强势领导人，但对暴力没什么胃口。以色列拥有一大批年轻的激进分子，其中许多人具有军事经验并持有宗教弥赛亚观点。
第四，匈牙利是一个微不足道的军事大国，没有面临严重的外部威胁。以色列是一个拥有强大军事机器的大国，包括核武库和可以打击世界任何地方的尖端网络武器。它还滋生了一种深深的生存不安全感，尤其是在极右翼中。
将这四个因素加在一起，很明显，一个不民主的以色列很可能会给世界带来与匈牙利截然不同的挑战。如果以色列的反民主政变成功，它将迫使以色列在世界各地的朋友、各地的犹太社区，尤其是以色列本国公民做出艰难的选择。
如果我可以以个人名义结束，我从未认真考虑过离开以色列。尽管这里存在许多问题，尽管收到了来自世界各地各大学和研究中心的许多邀请，但我一直认为留下来并尝试改变这里的事物比离开去更平静、更安全的地方更重要。但由于我的工作是思考和说出大多数人通常不喜欢的话，我怀疑我是否可以在一个对少数人权利和言论自由缺乏任何有意义保护的地方继续工作。
(不论我们的观点怎样，让我们记住乔治凯南的话：“我们必须有勇气和信心坚持自己对人类社会的看法。在应对苏联共产主义的这个问题时，我们面临的最大危险是，我们让自己变得像我们正在应对的那些人一样。”)
Opinion A disaster for democracy looms in Israel
By Yuval Noah Harari
What is happening with the Israeli government’s attempted Supreme Court overhaul is not a judicial reform but more akin to an antidemocratic coup. The government’s far-right coalition, which came to power less than two months ago, is legislating at breakneck speed a series of extremely controversial laws, which taken together mean one very simple thing: The government would have the power to pass any law it wants, and interpret existing laws in any way it likes, without checks on its power and without protection for minority rights.
In most democracies, the government’s power is checked and minority rights are protected through a number of mechanisms, such as a constitution, an independent Supreme Court, a federal system and recognition of international tribunals. None of these mechanisms would apply in the proposed new Israeli legal regime.
In its rhetoric, the government does not disown democracy. Like the far right elsewhere, it claims to be even more democratic than its critics. But this is based on a very narrow definition of democracy, focusing exclusively on an electoral majority, and in effect equating democracy with unrestricted majority dictatorship. Under the new legal regime, it is unclear what would prevent either the present government or a future one from passing laws that, for example, close down opposition newspapers, deny workers the right to strike, abolish academic freedom, criminalize homosexuality, outlaw Arab parties, disenfranchise Arab citizens or — perhaps most crucially — change the electoral system itself in a way that would guarantee a permanent hold on power.
When asked what would preclude such scenarios, protect minority rights and shield even the majority of citizens from governmental abuse of power, coalition members answer, in effect: “Our goodwill. Trust us.” This is a blood-curdling answer, familiar to the victims of every tyrant, mobster and abusive spouse in history. Dictators always say “trust us, we will protect you. But be careful not to lose our goodwill, yes? We don’t want anything bad to happen to you.” If you happen to meet anyone describing the antidemocratic coup in Israel as a benign democratic reform, there is one key question to ask them: “Explain to me: What mechanism would limit the power of the government under the new regime? Is there even one thing that the government will not be allowed to do?”
The threat is especially palpable because Israel is a very polarized society, and members of the ruling far-right coalition have often expressed their disdain for minority groups. Indeed, when the legislation was being debated in the Knesset this week, coalition member Almog Cohen from the Jewish Power party live-streamed the debate while making racist commentaries on members of Arab parties, comparing them to beasts. To what extent can Arabs and other minorities entrust their basic human rights to the goodwill of people like Cohen?
The immensity of the threat has led to the rise of a powerful resistance movement. Even parts of Israel’s high-tech sector, the economic engine of the start-up nation, have declared an emergency, giving employees time off to join protests in the streets of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. As international investors panic and billions of dollars already flee the country, the tech moguls know that without an independent judiciary and a democratic society, their entire industry is in danger.
If the resistance movement fails, what would an illiberal undemocratic Israel look like? Many people in Israel and elsewhere compare it to Hungary, especially as the Hungarian regime has very close ties to the new Israeli regime. But an undemocratic Israel would not be anything like Hungary.
First, Hungary is still a member of the European Union, and wants to remain so, which means that E.U. institutions and laws place a limit on what the Hungarian regime does. Israel is not part of any such union, and there would be no similar restrictions on the powers and ambitions of the new Israeli regime.
Second, Hungary’s government rules Hungarian citizens. In contrast, Israel rules millions of Palestinians in the occupied territories. As badly as democratic Israeli governments have treated the Palestinians, the situation would likely get far worse after the destruction of Israel’s democracy.
Third, the Hungarian population is aging, and Hungary’s regime is supported mainly by older conservative people who might like to follow a strong leader but who have little appetite for violence. Israel has a significant cohort of young radicals, many having military experience and holding religious messianic views.
Fourth, Hungary is an insignificant military power that faces no serious external threats. Israel is a major power commanding a formidable military machine including both a nuclear arsenal and cutting-edge cyber weapons that can strike anywhere in the world. It also nurtures a deep sense of existential insecurity, especially among the far right.
Add these four factors together, and it is clear that an undemocratic Israel is likely to pose a very different challenge than Hungary. If the antidemocratic coup in Israel succeeds, it would force Israel’s friends around the world, Jewish communities everywhere and, above all, Israel’s own citizens, to make difficult choices.
If I may end on a personal note, I have never seriously considered leaving Israel. Despite the many problems here, and despite receiving many invitations from various universities and research centers around the world, I always thought it was more important to stay and try to change things here than to leave for somewhere calmer and safer. But as my job is to think and say things that the majority often does not like, I doubt whether I could go on working in a place lacking any meaningful protection for minority rights and for the freedom of expression.